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PROVING INJURY TO COMPETITION IN PRIVATE
ANTITRUST SUITS PROVOKED BY CONCERTED
REFUSALS TO DEAL*
To win a private antitrust suit, the individual competitor who brings one
must demonstrate that his injury was occasioned by an injury to competition.1
A similar rule applies when the Government sues on account of harm to a com-
petitor,2 but injury to competition is then more readily established, for federal
agencies ordinarily contest only those practices which are felt throughout a
given market.2 A private claimant, on the other hand, is tempted to assert
that an injury to him is of itself sufficiently harmful to competition to violate
the antitrust statutes; should the assertion stand, he would come within section
4 of the Clayton Act, which provides that "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws" may recover treble damages from the person violating the laws.4 The
*Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958), afflrming
1956 Trade Cas. 72048 (N.D. Cal.), reztd, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4253 (U.S. April 6, 1,959)
(see Editors' Note p. 963 infra).
1. Compare Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 242-43 (1948) (plaintiff successful), with Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 510-11 (1940) (plaintiff unsuccessful).
2. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
3. See ATv'v GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST Rm. 349 (1955); Argument of United
States as amicus curiae, KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 27 U.S.L. WEEK
3240 (1959) (U.S. 1958 Term, No. 76).
4. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). See also Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat.
737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1952) (providing for private injunctive relief).
The "antitrust laws" referred to in § 4 of the Clayton Act include the Sherman
Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (4890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V, 1958),
which makes illegal "every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade"; Sherman Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
2 (Supp. V, 1958), outlawing monopolies, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies and
combinations to monopolize; Clayton Act § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952),
forbidding price discrimination; and Clayton Act § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §
14 (1952), forbidding sales or contracts conditioned upon an agreement not to use or
deal in the "commodities of a competitor . . . where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract . . . may be to substantially lessen competition . . ." Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952), condemning
"unfair methods of competition," may not be enforced by a suit under § 4 of the Clayton
Act. Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat. Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949),
aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
"The statute [§ 4 of the Clayton Act] does not confine its protection to consumers,
or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. . . . The Act is comprehensive in
its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices
by whomever they may be perpetrated." Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
Sue generally Loevinger, Private Action--The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3
ANTaHtUST BuLL. 167 (1958); Comment, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 447 (1958). For the view
that the granting of multiple damages should be made discretionary with the district
courts, see At'r' GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 378-79 (1955).
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courts, however, have long been hostile to claims which would turn this section
into a vehicle for redressing tortious business practices.5 At one time, a section
4 complaint was considered defective if it failed to allege "public injury" in
addition to private loss.6 Although this formalism is no longer a prerequisite
to a treble-damage suit, the courts continue to view antitrust legislation as de-
signed exclusively to protect markets from "undue limitations on competitive
conditions"--and not as a safeguard against individual, economic loss.1 Private
recovery follows only upon a showing that damage to the plaintiff proximately
resulted from such statutory infractions as price-fixing, 8 tying agreements,9
and unreasonable restrictions on market entry.10 Also open to attack are at-
tempts at monopolization I1 and restraints tending to modify the competitive
characteristics of a market.
12
One business practice which frequently provokes private antitrust action
is denying a trader access to his customers or suppliers. When such denial
results from the independent, unilateral action of individual customers or sup-
5. The main purpose of those laws was to protect the public from monopolies and
restraint of trade, and the private right of action for treble damages was incidental
and subordinate to that main purpose....
Public injury alone justifying the threefold increase in damages and being an
indispensable constituent of a claim for violation of the antitrust laws, a general
allegation of such injury is not sufficient.
Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 214 F.2d 891, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
A trader who fails in his attempt to state an antitrust violation may still be able
to maintain a tort action. See Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.
1956), petition for cert. dismnissed per stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957). But see note 75
infra.
For a broader concept of the role of private suits, see AT'rY GEN. NAT'L CoMsM.
ANTITRUST REP. 378 (1955) ; Argument of United States as amicus curiae, Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3240 (1959) (U.S. 1958 Term, No. 76).
6. See Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d
86, 89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952) ("There is no allegation . . . that
the public has been damaged or injured . ... ") ; Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180
F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1950); Abouaf v. 3. D. & A. B. Spreckles Co., 26 F. Supp. 330
(N.D. Cal. 1939).
7. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1957), reversing 231
F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956) ("The test as to sufficiency ... is whether 'the claim is wholly
.rivolous.' "); New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F2d 881 (10th
Cir. 1957) ; see Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Encore Stores,
Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 164 F. Supp. 82 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
8. E.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
9. E.g., Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
10. E.g., American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.
1950).
11. E.g., Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.),
cert. dedied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
12. E.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922). See
generally ATr'y GEN, Ns''L Conm. ANTIrRusr REP,. 5-42, 115-223 (1955).
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pliers, the antitrust laws generally countenance the consequences on the theory
that a single entrepreneur, acting alone, may fashion his business relationships
as he sees fit.13 When, however, a refusal to deal is undertaken by a group of
competitors acting in concert to coerce a trader, the courts are quick to outlaw
the refusal.' 4 Supreme Court dictum has categorized boycotts of this type as
13. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (2d
Cir. 1915) ; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937), id.
at 826 (D. Md. 1938). See generally United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919) ("[T]he act does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader . . . freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to
sell."); United States v. Park, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827, 829 (D.D.C. 1958), prob.
jurls, noted, 27 U.S.L. Wzx 3226 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1959) (Defendant manufacturer sug-
gested resale prices and requested wholesalers not to sell to other than licensed druggists:
"Clearly, the actions of defendant were properly unilateral and sanctioned by law ....
[The Colgate] doctrine continues to be law.") ; HALE & HALF, MARKEr PowER: SIZE AND
SHAPE UNDER THE SHmEIAN Acr §§ 2.20-.21 (1958); Seitz, Exclusive Arrangements
and Refusal To Deal Problems, 11 VAND. L. REv. 85 (1957) ; Barber, Refusals To Deal
Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955) ; A'r'y GEN. NAT'L
CO,.ni. ANTITRUST RE. 132-49 (1955); Comment, Refusals To Sell and Public Control
of Comnpetition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121 (1949).
Even an individual, unilateral refusal to deal is forbidden, however, if its purpose
is to attain a goal forbidden by the antitrust laws. Thus, a trader may not refuse to deal
in order to further a price-fixing scheme. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S.
441 (1922); see United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). Nor
may he refuse to deal in an attempt to secure or maintain monopoly power over a market.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); see Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit &
Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 434 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
But the antitrust laws do not prevent a trader from arbitrarily or irrationally refusing
to deal:
Before the Sherman Act it was the law that a trader might reject the offer of
a proposing buyer, for any reason- that appealed to him; it might be because he
did not like the other's business methods, or because he had some personal
difference with him, political, racial, or social. That was purely his own affair,
with which nobody else had any concern. Neither the Sherman Act, nor any
decision of the Supreme Court construing the same, nor the Clayton Act, has
changed the law in this particular.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., supra at 49; accord, Arthur v. Kraft-
Phenix Cheese Corp., supra.
In contrast, a public utility is required to serve from available production all potential
purchasers willing to meet the stated price. See HALF & HALF, op. cit. supra § 221;
PaossmR, TORTS 480 (2d ed. 1955) ; 4 REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 763 (1939).
14. Absent concertedness, the refusals would probably be unobjectionable. Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) ; Binderup v. Pathe Ex-
change, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) ; see Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters,
260 U.S. 501 (1923); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
Concerted refusals have also been attacked by the Government. The leading case is
Fashion Originators' Guild of America [FOGA] v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), affirming
114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940). FOGA was an association of textile- and dress-pattern designers
and manufacturers who "while continuing to compete with one another in many respects,
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illegal per se,15 and decisional law condemns them with little examination of
their purpose or anticompetitive effects. 16 At a minimum, concerted refusals
to deal are prima facie illegal and can be justified only if intended to achieve
ends unconnected with antitrust policy.' 7 This antipathy toward group boy-
combined among themselves to combat and, if possible, destroy all competition from the sale
of garments which are copies of their 'original creations.' " 312 U.S. at 461. FOGA's
method was to boycott all retail outlets who sold dresses which were "pirated" copies of
Guild patterns, and to refuse to sell textiles to garment manufacturers who also used
"pirated" textile and dress designs. The FTC presented no evidence that FOGA tactics
limited production, fixed prices, or reduced quality; nonetheless, the combination was found
to be a violation of §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act. "It is ... unlawful
to exclude from the market any of those who supply it-assuming that there is no independent
reason by virtue of their conduct to justify their exclusion-and it is no excuse for doing
so that their exclusion will result in benefits to consumers, or to the producers who remain."
114 F.2d at 85. The circuit court attached no importance to the fact that FOGA supplied
only a bit more than a third of the dress market. The Supreme Court catalogued the ways
FOGA violated the Sherman Act as (1) narrowing outlets for buying and selling; (2)
subjecting nonconforming buyers to a boycott; (3) preventing individual marketing de-
cisions by requiring disclosure of business records to the Guild; and (4) acting as an extra-
governmental regulatory agency. The Court cited Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914), as controlling. That decision held the Sherman
Act violated when association members agreed not to deal with wholesalers who also sold
directly to the public. Accord, Wholesale Dry Goods Institute v. FTC, 139 F.2d 230 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 770 (1944), affirining 34 F.T.C. 177 (1941) ; United States v.
Waltham Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Contra, Ruddy Brook Clothes,
Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 103 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1951), aff'd, 195
F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952) ; Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B. Spreckels
Co., 26 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (local grocer alleged wholesalers agreed not to sell
to him; held, no substantial effect on interstate commerce or on competition in the retail
grocery market). Although one case, United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684
(N.D. Ohio 1956), and some recent commentary, Notes, 71 HARv. L. Rav. 1531 (1958),
51 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1956), support the Abouaf "effect" test, the general view is that
concerted refusals which exclude others from the market are illegal regardless of their total
market effect, Kirkpatrick, Cdnnercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act
(pts. 1-2), 10 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 302, 387 (1942) ; Barber, supra note 13, at 880; A-r'Y
GEN. NAT'L Comma. ANTITRUST RP. 137 (1955).
15. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953) ; United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
16. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940),
aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), discussed note 14 supra; Wholesale Dry Goods Institute, Inc.
v. FTC, 139 F2d 230 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 770 (1944) ("such a combination
is unlawful no matter how pressing may be the evils which it is designed to correct") ;
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904) (tile association controlled only 1% of
the tile trade in the market area). But see Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign
Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952) ("The [effect of
the] restraint asserted was . . . as a lighted match to the temperature of all outdoors.").
See generally Seitz, supra note 13, at 101; Barber, supra note 13, at 875; Kirkpatrick,
supra note 14, at 311-13, 342.
17. See FOGA v. FTC, supra note 16, at 84, 312 U.S. at 465, discussed note 14 supra;
United States v. Waltham Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Ruddy Brook
Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., supra note 16 (insurance companies
may combine to refuse to deal with known firebug) ; 41 CoLum. L. REv. 941 (1941) (possible
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cotts springs in part from the view that antitrust legislation seeks to promote
free access to markets,' 8 and in part from the conclusion that any effective boy-
cott, by artificially controlling market structure, tends to usurp governmental
functions " or to create a monopoly for the boycotting parties.20 In virtually
all of the reported cases, additional elements may also have influenced the
decisions. Typically, the boycotting group wielded substantial market power,
and the persons harmed constituted either a large group of producers whose
output, if restricted, would affect prices, or an open-end class of competitors
who had refused or might refuse to comply with the boycotters' demands.
21
Thus, until recently, the courts had not passed on a concerted refusal to deal
directed against a single trader so small that his elimination would not in itself
affect market price.
A group boycott against a single trader may well underlie the section 4 case
of Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., now before the federal courts.
22
Plaintiff Klor's is a small retail outlet in the Mission District of San Francisco;
defendant Broadway-Hale owns a chain of department stores one of which
justifications might include bad credit, conscious misrepresentation, or prevention of breach
of contract with another). See generally LABrn & KITTELLE, TRADE AssoCiAoTio LAW AND
PRAcrTic §§ 10.1-.11 (1956) (discussion of means of eliminating trade abuses and "unfair"
competition).
18. See FOGA v. FTC, supra note 16, at 85, 312 U.S. at 465; Binderup v. Pathe Ex-
change, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 392,
396 (1947) ("it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market") ; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945) ("The Sherman Act
was specifically intended to prohibit independent businesses from becoming 'associates' in
a common plan which is bound to reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the
things in which the groups compete.").
19. See FOGA v. FTC, supra note 16, at 85, 312 U.S. at 465.
20. See Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 46 (1904); FOGA v. FTC, supra
note 16, at 85, 312 U.S. at 468.
The monopoly analysis is circular, for an effective boycott tends both to create a monopoly
and to suggest-by evidencing an ability to reduce competition-the existence of present
monopoly power. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S.
1 (1945), classified both FOGA and Montague as monopoly cases, but then inexplicably
statud it to be only "arguable" that a boycott is always illegal. See generally HALE & HALE,
op. cit. supra note 13, § 2.21.
21. See, e.g., FOGA v. FTC, supra note 16 (many competitors); Montague & Co. v.
Lowry, supra note 20 (open-end class); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291
(1923) (same); New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881 (10th
Cir. 1957) (same).
But see two cases decided on the pleadings: Professional & Business Men's Life Ins.
Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958) (allegation of attempted secon-
dary boycott against small local insurance company held to state a cause of action) ; Ruddy
Brook Clothes, Inc v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 103 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1951),
afftd, 195 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952) (dismissing complaint on
de mininis grounds).
22. 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958), affirming 1956 Trade Cas. 72048 (N.D. Cal.),
;,'V'd, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4253 (US. April 6, 1959) (see Editors' Note p. 963 infra).
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adjoins Klor's.23 The complaint alleged that Broadway-Hale had induced the
other defendants-ten leading radio, television and appliance manufacturers
and their regional distributors-not to sell their products to Klor's. 24 Accord-
ing to a further allegation, Broadway-Hale purchases such a great volume of
these products that it enjoys sufficient oligopsonistic power to cause the manu-
facturers to boycott Klor's on pain of losing Broadway-Hale's business. 25
Without denying these allegations, the defendants moved for summary judg-
ment upon affidavits showing that Klor's could still satisfy its requirements
by buying from other manufacturers ;26 that many hundreds of retail dealers
sell appliances in the San Francisco area ;27 and that, in the Mission District
alone, over fifty retail outlets carry the products of the defendant manufact-
urers.
28
The district court, in granting summary judgment for defendants, character-
ized the complaint as evidencing "purely a private quarrel" which does not give
rise to a cause of action under the antitrust laws.29 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. It reasoned that treble-damage actions serve to implement antitrust
policy, and that, while an allegation of "public injury" is no longer vital to a
private complaint, "the purpose of the antitrust statutes is to protect the 'public'
from the harm which follows from concerted or monopolistic conduct designed
to acquire control of a market, usually competitive, to which the public must
ultimately resort . . . .,0 Turning to the alleged unlawful restraint, the court
23. Broadway-Hale has at least three stores in San Francisco, Record, p. 91, and
numerous Los Angeles, Sacramento and San Jose outlets, as evidenced by its telephone
directory listings.
24. Record, pp. 5-10. The defendant manufacturers are Admiral Corp., Emerson Radio
& Phonograph Corp., General Electric Co., Olympic Radio & Television, Inc., Philco Corp.,
Radio Corp. of America, Rheem Mfg. Co., Tappan Stove Co., Whirlpool-Seeger Corp.,
and Zenith Radio Corp.
25. Id. at 11-12. The complaint alleged that Broadway-Hale's "monopoly buying
power" was the source of the boycott. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 25-27. Among the alternative brands alleged to remain open to Kor's were
Amana, Bendix, Frigidaire, Hotpoint, Kelvinator, Magnavox, Maytag, Motorola, Norge,
and Westinghouse.
27. Id. at 29-43 (15 pages from San Francisco classified telephone directory).
28. Id. at 45-125 (affidavits of defendant manufacturers' agents enumerating their indi-
vidual outlets in the Mission District and/or San Francisco, and acknowledging that they
had not sold to Kior's) ; Brief for Appellees, map facing p. 8 (showing location of TV and
appliance stores in Mission District).
29. 1956 Trade Cas. 72048 (N.D. Cal.).
30. 255 F.2d 214, 231 (9th Cir. 1958). The opinion was by Judge Stanley N. Barnes,
former head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and cochairman of
the committee which produced the A-r', GE. NA'L Comm. ANTITRUrST RP. (1955). The
court had to distinguish Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957),
discussed note 7 supra, in which the Antitrust Division, then under Assistant Attorney
General Barnes, had supported the petitioner's argument that his complaint, not containing
any specific allegation of public injury, was sufficient. The principal case was distinguished
because it involved a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss as in Radovich.
The Justice Department, appearing as amicus for the plaintiff in argument before the
Supreme Court in Klor's argued that Judge Barnes had misapplied the antitrust law
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held that the refusals to deal were not per se illegal because the defendants neither
attempted to secure monopoly power nor sought to control prices.31 The court
further ruled that a boycott could not be deemed to restrain trade unreasonably
absent a "charge or proof that by any act of defendants the price, quantity, or
quality [of goods] offered the public was affected."'32 And the large number
of substitute retail outlets available to consumers indicated that "there has been
no conduct by which the 'public' could conceivably suffer injury.7
33
However the applicable substantive law be construed, this case seems unripe
for summary judgment. Plaintiff's appeal was from such a judgment entered
solely upon the complaint and defendants' affidavits.34 Since the defendants
had moved for summary judgment, they had the burden of showing "beyond
the slightest doubt" that no dispute existed over any relevant fact necessary to
resolve the issues raised by the complaint. 35 Mforeover, the complaint should
have been liberally construed, and all reasonable inferences of fact should have
been drawn, in Plaintiff's favor.36 Although somewhat ambiguous, the complaint
involved and had thus erred on the procedural point raised. 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3240 (1959)
(U.S. 1958 Term, No. 76).
31. See 255 F.2d at 233-34.
32. Id. at 230; see id. at 234.
33. Id. at 235. The court of appeals relied heavily on Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940). In Apex, an employer brought a treble-damage antitrust suit against a
labor union which had engaged in a sitdown strike. The employer argued that the strike
restrained trade by preventing previously manufactured Apex products from being shipped
in interstate commerce. Holding the Sherman Act inapplicable, the Court, after discussing
the origins of the Sherman Act and the meaning of "restraint of trade," concluded:
The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition . . . which
tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the
detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come
to be regarded as a special form of public injury.
Restraints on competition or on the course of trade in the merchandising of
articles moving in interstate commerce is not enough, unless the restraint is shown
to have or is intended to have an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise to
deprive purchasers or consumers of the advantages which they derive from free
competition.
310 U.S. at 493, 500-01. The Apex Court's insistence on an actual anticompetitive effect in
the market-as opposed to an adverse effect upon the injured manufacturer-apparently
stemmed from a desire to distinguish earlier cases which had subjected labor union activity
to Sherman Act strictures.
34. 255 F.2d at 219-20; Record, pp. 3-12, 45-125.
35. See Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944); Lane Bryant
v. Maternity Lane, Ltd., 173 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Doehler Metal Furniture Co.
v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1945) ("slightest doubt" test).
36. See 6 Mooa, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1111 56.15[1], [3] (2d ed. 1953). The complaint
must show "facts, not conclusions of law." Dickheiser v. Pennsylvania R.R., 5 F.R.D. 5
(E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd per curiam, 155 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808
(1947). And the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must point out what
opposing evidence or issues are presented. Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States,
135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
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did allege that the defendants, acting "in collaboration," had conspired "together,
and each with the other" to prevent Kor's from obtaining the defendant manu-
facturers' products.8 7 Favorably construed, this allegation asserts that Klor's
was the victim of an illegal group boycott.38 The defendants' affidavits neither
contradicted this allegation nor provided sufficient facts to answer the questions
which the Ninth Circuit opinion postulates as decisive on the boycott issue:
What percentage of the pertinent retail supply do the manufacturing defendants
control? How strong is the competition among the remaining retailers? Did
the manufacturing defendants cut off Klor's for legitimate business reasons, or
for the purpose of influencing prices or gaining monopoly ?39 The manufacturers
set forth by affidavit the number of their local outlets; Broadway-Hale, the
number of alternative brands available to Klor's and the number of retailers in
the local appliance market. 40 These statistics alone do not provide a "beyond-
the-slightest-doubt" basis for answering the circuit court's questions in the
defendants' favor.41 Accordingly, the case should be remanded for further
proceedings.
If a concerted refusal to deal is shown on remand but (as the Ninth Circuit
says) is not illegal per se,42 then Klor's, to prove a violation of the antitrust
laws, 43 must establish two facts. First, that it met with the concerted refusal on
account of its competitive practices. And, second, that the boycott operates to
intimidate other small dealers in the San Francisco market and to inhibit them
in the formulation of their own retailing policies. 44 On the first point, Kor's
can apparently show that it had been boycotted because it would not adhere to
the manufacturers' suggested retail prices.45 On the second, plaintiff might
attempt to prove that many retailers cannot attract customers and remain in
business without having access to some or most of the defendant manufacturers'
products, and that small outlets, fearing the Kor's treatment, will therefore
be under pressure to obey the pricing and marketing dictates of Broadway-Hale
37. Record, pp. 9, 12.
38. See Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F.
Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958) (complaint alleging that defendants tried to "induce public
not to use plaintiff" sufficient to state a secondary boycott, which the court considered a
per se violation of the Sherman Act; no allegation of "public injury" necessary; Klor's
distinguished as summary judgment action).
39. 255 F2d at 230.
40. Record, pp. 25-125.
41. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1958) (dissenting
opinion). Purpose to monopolize is certainly one question not resolved by the defendants'
affidavits. This issue requires a trial in order to permit cross-examination and make de-
meanor evidence available. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1946).
42. 255 F.2d at 233-34.
43. That is, in the Ninth Circuit's language, to prove "public injury." Id. at 231.
44. See Barber, stupra note 13, at 875, 880; Kirkpatrick, supra note 14, at 305, 392;
ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANnTRUST REP. 137 (1955).
45. Letter from Irvin Goldstein, Attorney for Klor's, Inc., to the Yale Law Jcnurnal,
Feb. 5, 1959, on file in Yale Lav Library.
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and the defendant manufacturers. 46 Such a psychological restraint could exist
even though the defendants did not have the power (or even the inclination) to
eliminate enough offending dealers to affect price directly. Rare is the appli-
ance dealer who, standing alone, can prevent his major suppliers, acting in
concert, from ruining him.47 Once the defendants had exhibited the power to
cripple or exclude a trader, they might be expected to utilize that power to
the same end again. True, if the manufacturers were motivated by nonbusiness
objectives, that is, if the reasons for cutting Klor's off were irrational ones,
then other retailers would not be induced to alter their competitive practices.
And the antitrust laws would then have no reason to operate, for they are
designed to promote competitive markets, not to assure the injured trader
a tort remedy. 48 Still, it approaches the irrational to impute irrational motives
to executives charged with the direction of vast corporate investments. Given
evidence that a concerted boycott is intended to achieve an economic goal like
resale price maintenance, a defense resting on nonbusiness policy should ordi-
narily be rejected.
49
A more difficult evidentiary problem faces Kor's on remand-that of
proving the combination or conspiracy which, according to the complaint,
existed among the defendant manufacturers. Absent a showing that a num-
ber of firms on the same horizontal level acted in concert, plaintiff would
probably be unable to establish an illegal boycott as defined in the cases.50
46. See Mund, The Right To Buy-and Its Denial to Small Business, S. Doc. No. 32,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-103 (1957).
47. See id. at 56-58, 95-96. Coercive pressure would be minimal, however, if the sup-
pliers were not acting in concert and alternative brands remained available, see note 59
infra, or if the boycotters did not control a significant portion of the supply. The portion
of supply controlled by the defendants in turn depends on how the applicable product market
is defined. In the principal case, if the market for all appliances is the proper one, then
the relevant test would measure all the defendants' output against that of all competing
brands. This is a plausible approach, since the defendants by and large produce a full line
of appliances. Record, pp. 25-27. General Electric, for example, competes with RCA and
Emerson in radios and television, with Admiral and Philco in refrigerators, with Rheem
and Tappan in stoves, and with Whirlpool in dryers and washers. If the market is defined
in terms of individual products, the following data would be pertinent: Defendants produc-
ing: Radios and television-Admiral, Emerson, General Electric, Olympic, Philco, RCA,
and Zenith; Refrigerators-Admiral, General Electric, and Philco; Stoves-Admiral, Gen-
eral Electric, Rheem, and Tappan; Clothes washers and dryers-General Electric and Whirl-
pool.
48. See Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), petition for
cert. dismissed per stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957). For possible torts and remedies, see
1 HaRPER & JAMEs, ToRTs §§ 6.6, 6.13 (1956); PRossE.ToRTs 720-60 (2d ed. 1955).
Absent a finding of either personal malice or monopoly intent, neither the manufacturers'
refusals to deal nor Broadway-Hale's inducement or coercion of their refusals would appear
to constitute an actionable tort. See 4 RESTATEMENT, ToRts §§ 765-68 and accompanying
comments (1939) ; note 75 infra.
49. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940),
aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), discussed note 14 supra; United States v. Waltham Watch Co.,
47 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
50. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951)
("Seagram and Calvert acting individually perhaps might have refused to deal with petition-
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For this reason, Klor's would have to introduce evidence to support the in-
ference that the simultaneous refusals to deal resulted not from coincidental
individual decisions but from joint action.5 ' The principal reason for assum-
ing that the refusals were triggered by an agreement is that the plaintiff's
suppliers compete with each other for profits which are geared to volume
of sales.52 Were but one manufacturer to discontinue serving an outlet
supplied by many, that manufacturer would in effect forfeit his volume of
sales to his competitors. 53 A joint refusal, on the other hand, precludes
competitive disadvantage. Nevertheless, the manufacturer defendants in Kor's
may not have acted in concert. Each of them individually may have been
interested in preserving the profit margins of his retail outlets at a level
higher than that which perfect, short-run competition would achieve, even
though his total volume of sales might suffer, for high retail profits are essential
to the maintenance of a stable distributional network.54 Since appliances are
er or with any or all of the Indiana wholesalers. But the Sherman Act makes it an offense
for respondents to agree among themselves to stop selling to particular customers.);
Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 925 (.1953) (unilateral refusal to deal legal; "intracorporate conspiracy" of
managerial personnel not basis of Sherman Act violation).
Compare Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 312 (1923) ("the illegality
consists, not in the separate action of each, but in the conspiracy and combination of all"),
with Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per
curitam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957) (no violation for
manufacturer unilaterally to refuse to continue dealer franchise at behest of other dealer
who thereby gained exclusive area franchise), and Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), reversing
135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955) (same).
51. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914). "It is elementary . . . that conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct
testimony and may be inferred from the things actually done, and when [as] in this
case . . . the names of wholesalers . . . were periodically reported to the other members
... the conspiracy... may be readily inferred." Id. at 612. The proof of contemporaneous
identical action-so-called "conscious parallelism"-has been held to establish a conspiracy
if it can be shown that each defendant knew what the others were doing and if the defendants
offer no evidence indicating that their activities were based upon individual, independent
decisions. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (complex, nation-wide basing-
point system so unlikely to evolve without collaboration that conspiracy inferred);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) ("acceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan . . . is
sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy"). But see Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) (affirming jury refusal to find con-
spiracy despite extensive evidence of parallel action; " 'conscious parallelism' has not yet
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act"). See generally Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L Co m. ANTI-
TRUST RE'. 36-42 (1955).
52. See Bus. Week, Feb. 7, 1959, p. 56.
53. See HALE & HALE, MARKET PowR: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SUM-SAN
AcT § 2.21 (1958) ; Mund, supra note 46, at 30, 42. ,
54. See id. at 56-59. California permits the "fair trading" of brand name goods, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16900-05 (1954), but the defendant manufacturers in the Klor's case
did not use this device to sustain their outlets' profit-margins. When interviewed, one of
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promotion-elastic 55 and their reputation largely dependent upon dealer service,
a manufacturer may often seek to avoid cutthroat competition among his retail
outlets. If, for example, Klor's had reduced its prices to the point that it
could not undertake a normal amount of distributive advertising and servic-
ing, each of its suppliers may have immediately and independently decided to
eliminate it. By themselves, coincidental decisions of this sort do not constitute
an illegal boycott.5 6
Should the plaintiff be unable to prove a horizontal conspiracy among the
defendant manufacturers, it might still succeed against Broadway-Hale by
showing that the chain store had separately induced each manufacturer to
agree not to deal with Klor's. Broadway-Hale's power to exact such agree-
ments would presumably depend on its ability to shift with relative ease
from one supplier to another, and on its suppliers' inability to replace it as
an effective sales, promotional, and service outlet. 7 A series of independent,
vertical agreements thus induced would create a "wedge-shaped" combination
posing the same threat of competitive restraint as would a combination or
conspiracy among the manufacturers themselves.58 Furthermore (again as in
the case of a horizontal boycott) the demonstrated reach of Broadway-Hale's
oligopsonistic power might serve to restrain the competitive practices of other
retailers-even if Broadway-Hale lacks the capacity to eliminate enough other
outlets either to affect price directly or to gain a monopoly.59
the defendant manufacturers who has never utilized the fair-trade laws stated that none
of the defendants has used them.
55. See GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 155-58 (1958)
56. See Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 312 (1923) ("each of the
distributors, acting separately, could have refused to furnish films to the exhibitor without
becoming amenable to the provisions of the [Sherman] act"). For the position that refusals
to sell have no place in the free market, see Mund, supra note 46, at 97-99.
57. See BurNs, NEAL & WATsoN, MODERN EcoNomics 290 (2d ed. 1953). The book
discusses the power that can be exerted by a volume buyer upon suppliers of goods and
services who need it as an outlet, and who are competing with each other for this outlet.
Such power is denominated "oligopsonistic" or "monopsonistic." The simplest example is
that of a single-company town in which the company can hire labor at low wages because
it is the sole market buyer. A number of volume buyers can individually exert oligopsonistic
power against competitive suppliers of varying sizes.
58. See United States v. Waltham Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
(oligopolist organizing refusal to deal through independent agreements with distributors
on the next lower competitive level; this pyramid-shaped combination poses same threat
as horizontal agreement among distributors). A wedge-shaped combination is closely
analogous to a secondary boycott: the "exercise [of] coercive pressure upon ... [the
plaintiff's] customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold patronage."
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 466 (1921). Compare Binderup v.
Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) (local film distributors' association had national
suppliers cut off nonconforming local distributor and exhibitor).
59. See notes 44, 46-47 supra and accompanying text. This wedge-shaped combination
is to be distinguished from the combinations at issue in the dealer-franchise cases. In a
typical dealer-franchise case, a dealer induces a single supplier to discontinue dealing with
a rival dealer. Hence, no horizontal, multiple refusal to deal occurs and the element of
19591
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
But the Ninth Circuit did not consider the alleged restraint's effect on the
competitive nature of the market. Rather, it discussed the distinction between
public and private injury, then defined "public injury" solely in terms of
a direct effect upon the price of consumer goods. 6° The court thereby placed
a needless barrier in the path of private antitrust actions. More realistically,
an antitrust violation should be found whenever a market is so overcast by
the shadow of some vertical or horizontal combination, or by a cloud of
monopoly power, that independent, competitive decision-making is restrained.0 '
The courts should allow any trader in such a market to bring a treble-damage
action against the looming combination or monopoly if it injured him, for trade
has been effectively restrained even in the absence of a demonstrable impact
on an ascertainable "public.
'62
In refusing to remand the Klor's case for evidence of the boycott's effect
on San Francisco retailers, the Ninth Circuit maintained that combinations
of competitors which injure traders but do not affect market price are exempt
from Sherman Act coverage.6 3 But antitrust policy, postulated on free com-
petition,64 marks all coalitions of competitors as suspect.6 5 And when com-
cocertedness, be it actual or constructive, is lacking. See, e.g., Shotkin v. General Elec.
Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138
F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 823 (1957); Kessler, Autdinobile Dealer Franchises; Vertical Integration by Cott-
tract, 66 YAM L.J. 1135, 1165-67 (1957).
Courts deciding the franchise cases have assumed that the excluded merchant can enter
into a new alliance with a competing manufacturer, so that the competitive nature of the
market is but slightly affected, if at all. This "alternative source of supply" assumption
has both been questioned, HALE & HAI op. cit. supra note 53, § 2.20, at 58 n.2, § 10.10, at
391, and rejected, see Mund, supra note 46, at 97-98 et passim.
60. 255 F.2d at 230.
61. See HALE & HALE, op. cit. supra note 53, § 10.10.
62. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
235-43 (1948).
63. 255 F.2d at 230; Accord, Ruddy Brook Clothes v. British & Foreign Marine Ins.
Co., 103 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Il. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 816 (1952) ; Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co., 26 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal.
1939). But see New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881 (10th Cir.
1957).
64. The Sherman Act was designed to be a competitive charter of ecnomic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained -interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing
an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see ATrT'v GEN. NAT'L CoMM.
ANTITRUST REP. 317 (1955).
65. See LAMB & KiTTELLE, TRADE AssocIAToN LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (1956)
(innocent trade associaton practices run the risk of being misconstrued as restrictive
practices). Compare 1 SMITH, THE WrALrH OF NATIONS 117 (Everyman ed. 1910)
("People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
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petitors undertake a joint boycott in order to coerce or eliminate a third party,
they pursue an unfair method of competition in order to achieve an anti-
competitive advantage. 6  Although the Sherman Act focuses on unreasonable
restraints of trade rather than unfair methods of competition, the two are not
wholly separable, 67 for the act reflects in part congressional concern that aggre-
gations of economic power will drive small dealers out of business and
eliminate a worthy class of self-reliant citizens.68 A similar affinity for the
individual trader may be found in judicial interpretations of the act.69 The
courts early declared that it makes affirmatively illegal those contracts which
were unenforceable at common law 7°---that is, those which restrain trade but
are not "ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary
to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the
contract. '71 Among the contracts which could not be so justified were those
instituting group boycotts.72 Certainly, boycotters who pursue a common
policy of exclusion may no longer invoke the doctrine which permits the indi-
vidual entrepreneur to choose his own customers. 73 Moreover, modern de-
cisions indicate that the Sherman Act forbids any jointly undertaken preda-
tory practices which foreclose individual traders from the market place.
74
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices.").
66. Wholesale Dry Goods Institute, Inc. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 770 (1944), affirming 34 F.T.C. 177 (1941) (boycott by wholesalers
of manufacturers who sold to retail chain outlets at same price as to wholesalers
held to constitute unfair method of competition, Federal Trade Commission Act § 5,
38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952)); see A-r'y GEN-. NAT'L COmm. AnTrusr
REP. 137 (1955); Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103
U. PA. L. Rzv. 847, 875 (1955).
67. See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953)
(the defendants' scheme "sewed up a market so tightly [that it] . . . falls within the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act and is therefore an 'unfair method of competition'
within the meaning of . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act") ; FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (same).
68. See 21 CoNr. REzc 1768, 2564, 2569 (1890).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-1issouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-26
(1897), quoted in Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467
(1941) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949) (dissenting opinion
of Douglas, J.); cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 376-77
(1933) ; American Column & Lumber Co., v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 417-18 (1921)
(dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.).
70. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 278-79 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497-98
(1940).
71. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., supra note 70, at 282; see id. at 286,
289, 291-94; Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 404 (1904) (dissenting
opinion of Holmes, J.).
72. See, e.g., Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25, 46, 58
(1891).
73. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
74. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941),
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Hence, the Court might prohibit coercive group boycotts irrespective of any
demonstrable harm to competition. This prohibition could proceed from the
hypothesis that concerted refusals to deal, by wreaking severe, anticompeti-
tive harm on individual competitors, 5 make injury to competition intolerably
likely,70 especially if the boycotters wield oligopolistic power.77
affirming 114 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1940); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S.
291, 312 (1923) ; Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484, 486-87
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's,
Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 164 F.2d 1021
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948) ("The purpose of the anti-trust laws-an
intendment to secure equality of opportunity-is thwarted if group-power is utilized to
eliminate a competitor who is equipped to compete.").
The right of traders not to be foreclosed from the market is made even more explicit
in cases involving individual refusals to deal by individuals who hold substantial market
power. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947)
("it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market").
75. If conspirators boycott a trader not out of malice or spite but in order to
enhance their own competitive position, their interference with the trader's business ex-
pectations ordinarily is not an actionable tort. 4 REsTA MENT, ToRTs § 765 (1939).
California generally follows the Restatement position. See Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier,
18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941); Masoni v. Board of Trade, 119 Cal. App. 2d
738, 260 P.2d 205 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). If the boycott is a combination in restraint
of trade under California statute, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-58 (1954), it
constitutes an actionable interference with business relations, Speegle v. Board of Fire
Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946). In the principal case, absent personal
animosity, Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
(intimidation and coercion of customers because plaintiff hired Negro), or fraud or mis-
representation, Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 217 P.2d 19 (1950) (defendant
dogfood dealer spread rumors that plaintiff-competitor was using diseased horse-meat),
Broadway-Hale's inducing the defendant manufacturers' refusals to sell in order to get
Klor's business would not constitute tortious conduct, see Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App.
2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935) ; 4 RESTAEENT, TORTS § 768 (1939) (com-
petitor privileged to induce refusals to deal in attempting to garner others' business).
Hence, absent antitrust protection, the trader will have no redress. In the principal
case, Kior's would have little chance of recovery against Broadway-Hale and the de-
fendant manufacturers in a suit under the state antitrust laws, CAL. Bus. & Pnor.
CODE §§ 16700-58 (1954). See Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp., 152 Cal. App. 2d 418,
313 P.2d 936 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (plaintiff's competitors allegedly combined and
induced Hudson to cancel plaintiff's franchise and to refuse to sell plaintiff any more
cars; held, no cause of action). Compare Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ohrbach's,
Inc., 266 App. Div. 535, 42 N.Y.S.2d 703, appeal dismissed, 291 N.Y. 707, 52 N.E.2d
595 (1943), in which Alexander's brought suit under the New York antitrust law, N.Y.
GEx. Bus. LAw § 340, alleging that Ohrbach's had induced two affiliated dress manu-
facturers to refuse to sell any goods to Alexander's during the latter's price war with
Ohrbach's. It was admitted that a multitude of other lines were available to the plaintiff,
who did not allege either monopoly intent, price-fixng, or boycott, but only that the
manufacturers' goods were widely advertised, were of the best quality, and were neces-
sary to maintain customer goodwill. The court reversed the trial court's verdict for
the defendants, 180 Misc. 18, 40 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1943), and entered a decree
for the plaintiff, stating:
This is not a case of a manufacturer freely refusing to sell his products to
a particular retailer. Nor is it the case of a manufacturer giving one retailer
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A concerted refusal to deal, then, whether in the form of a direct or "wedge-
shaped" combination, might be considered a per se violation of the Sherman
Act regardless of perceptible market effect. Rational businessmen will not
attempt such a combination unless they believe that they are able to gain that
more-than-competitive advantage which antitrust policy would forbid.78 Thus,
proof that defendant businessmen participated in a plan to coerce a private
plaintiff through a boycott could be held sufficient to establish a treble-damage
claim, for the participants in the plan are themselves the best judges of whether
they have the power to achieve their goal.
a so-called "exclusive" on merely one fabric, style or garment. On the contrary,
we think the evidence shows that Ohrbach, using its superior economic buying
power, finally prevailed upon the defendant manufacturers to refuse to sell to
Alexander, not merely one line of fabric, but any merchandise whatever, and
that the object and effect of such arrangement were to destroy Alexander as a
competitor of Ohrbach in defendants' products which Alexander had been selling
for years.
266 App. Div. at 538, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 706. New York does not allow punitive or multiple
damages, however, Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ohrbach's, Inc., 269 App. Div.
321, 56 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1945), while California provides double damages in private
antitrust actions, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (1954).
76. See Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act,
10 GrEo. WASH. L. REv. 387, 392-93, 405 (1942) ; Mund, supra note 46, at 29-59.
77. When oligopoly power is sufficiently great, the oligopolists might even be deemed
under a common-law duty to serve all would-be customers on identical terms. See
id. at 3-6 (doctrine of "public calling"); note 13 supra (duty of public utility).
78. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940);
HALE & HALE, op. cit. supra note 53, § 221; Kirkpatrick, supra note 76, at 392.
EDiToas' NOTE: On April 6, 1959, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision and remanded the principal case to the district court for trial. The Court ruled
that the Klor's complaint alleged a boycott which, if proved, "is not to be tolerated mere-
ly because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruc-
tion makes little difference to the economy." 27 U.S.L. XVEEK 4253, 4254 (U.S. April
6, 1959).
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